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COMAH LAND USE PLANNING ASSESSMENT OF GALWAY HARBOUR ENTERPRISE PARK AT GALWAY HARBOUR

Technical Report Prepared For

Galway Harbour Company

Technical Report Prepared By

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

AWN Consulting Ltd. was requested by the Galway Harbour Company to complete a land use planning assessment addressing potential constraints posed by the Circle K Galway Terminal Upper Tier COMAH establishment to the development of the Galway Harbour Extension, Co. Galway.

The assessment is completed following the Health and Safety Authority's Guidance on technical land-use planning advice For planning authorities and COMAH establishment operators (HSA, 2023).

The Circle K Galway Upper Tier COMAH establishment provides for the importation and storage of ULSD (ultra-low sulphur diesel), kero (kerosene) and gasoline from ships. It also receives ethanol from road tankers. Pool fire, vapour cloud explosion and flash fire major accident scenarios were assessed for land use planning purposes.

Gexcon Riskcurves Version 12.3.0 modelling software was used to model the cumulative risk contours for the Circle K establishment.

The consequence results, frequencies of major accident hazards and Athenry synoptic station wind speed and frequency data (see Figure 4) were input to the software. The fraction for D5 (daytime conditions) was 0.8 and the fraction for F2 night time conditions was 0.2.

The individual risk contours, to persons outdoors and persons indoors (CIA 3, representative category for buildings at proposed development), for the Circle K upper tier COMAH establishment corresponding to the boundaries of the Inner, Middle and Outer risk-based land use planning zones are illustrated on the following Figures.

Individual Risk of Fatality Contours, to Persons Outdoors, for Circle K Galway Terminal

Individual Risk of Fatality Contours, to Persons Indoors (CIA 3), for Circle K Galway Terminal

The following is concluded:

- The individual risk contours, to persons outdoors corresponding to the Outer Land Use Planning zone extends to the proposed development. The contour extends to a small section of the Marina Promenade, the Renmore Promenade and the Rail Link, where it is possible that persons will be present outdoors.
- The individual risk contours, to persons indoors corresponding to the Outer Land Use Planning zone extends to the proposed development. The contour extends to the Harbour Stores building. This building could be occupied 24 hours per day; therefore, persons are present indoors.

The Table below details the matrix that is used by the HSA to advise on suitable development for technical LUP purposes:

Level of Sensitivity	Inner Zone (Zone 1)	Middle Zone (Zone 2)	Outer Zone (Zone 3)
Level 1	✓	✓	✓
Level 2	×	✓	✓
Level 3	×	×	✓
Level 4	×	×	×

LUP Sensitivity Matrix

The Harbour Stores building is a work place that will have fewer than 100 occupants and fewer than three occupied storeys. Therefore, it is classified as a Sensitivity Level 1 establishment and is permitted within the inner, middle and outer zones.

These areas could have up to 200 No. persons present; therefore, they are classified as '*Outdoor use by the Public – predominantly open-air developments likely to attract the general public in numbers greater than 100 people, but up to 1,000 people at any one time'* and is a Sensitivity Level 3 development. Therefore, it is permitted within the outer zone.
The Rail Link is a Sensitivity Level 1 development; therefore, it is permitted within the inner, middle and outer zones.

It is concluded that the proposed development is permitted within the Land Use Planning zones at the Circle K establishment.

<u>Societal Risk</u>

A societal risk analysis was completed and the expectation value (EV) at the proposed development was calculated as **48.4**.

The Guidance on Technical Land Use Planning (HSA, 2023) states:

> *'for new developments near an establishment, where the calculated off-site EV at the development greater than 2,000, further assessment of societal risk will be required.'*

The total Expectation Value (EV) at the proposed development is **48.4.** This is <2,000; therefore, no further risk calculation is required.

It is concluded that there are no constraints posed by the Circle K Galway Terminal Upper Tier COMAH establishment to the development of the Galway Harbour Extension.

CONTENTS

TABLES

FIGURES

1.0 INTRODUCTION

AWN Consulting Ltd. was requested by the Galway Harbour Company to complete a land use planning assessment addressing potential constraints posed by the Circle K Galway Terminal Upper Tier COMAH establishment to the development of the Galway Harbour Extension, Co. Galway.

The assessment is completed following the Health and Safety Authority's Guidance on technical land-use planning advice For planning authorities and COMAH establishment operators (HSA, 2023).

This report outlines the following:

- Overview of proposed works and Circle K Galway Terminal;
- Assessment methodology and criteria;
- Identification of major accident scenarios;
- Assessment of major accident hazards;
- Land Use Planning risk contours;
- Societal risk constraints;
- Conclusions.

2.0 OVERVIEW OF PROPOSED DEVELOPMENT AND CIRCLE K GALWAY TERMINAL

2.1 Proposed Development

The proposed Harbour Extension development will consist of *ca.* 27 ha of reclaimed land using salvaged dredged silts and sands capped with a rock fill. The proposed Galway Harbour Extension development will provide improved infrastructure to consolidate existing business, develop new business and services, provide for the international cruise liner business, and facilitate the economic growth of the region.

The proposed development will include: -

- Quay walls, breakwaters, and wave walls to create commercial quays and a deep-water docking facility, extending southwards into Galway Bay
- Dredging to create a new approach channel to the commercial quays and the deep-water docking facility berths.
- Reclamation of *ca.* 27 ha from the foreshore and seabed
- Development of the reclaimed lands and redevelopment of part of the adjacent Galway Harbour Enterprise Park lands for Harbour related business
- Marina on the western side, including the Marina Promenade
- Fishing quays, slipway for a lifeboat station and a nautical centre on the eastern side, including the Renmore Promenade
- A twin track freight rail link from the existing Galway to Dublin rail line to the commercial quays, including embankments, rail over-bridge to existing service road and noise abatement screening. This will be freight rail only.
- Harbour related buildings, including Port Operations Office (4 storeys); Harbour Management Warehouse (single storey); Marina Office (single storey); Passenger Terminal (single storey); and ancillary car parking and site services.
- The construction of oil and bitumen transfer pipelines to the existing oil and bitumen tank farms on the Galway Harbour Enterprise Park

Table 1 details the buildings and occupancies associated with the proposed development.

Building	Height (storeys)	Expected Occupancy (number of persons)	Time of Occupancy
Harbour Stores Warehouse	1	10	24 hours
Marina Office	1	10	24 hours
Harbour Office	4	5 - daytime 2 – night-time	24 hours
Cruise Terminal Building	1	100	5 hours per day (see Note 1)
Security Gatehouse	1	2	24 hours

Table 1 Building Occupancies for Proposed Development

Note 1

Cruise Passengers will only be facilitated by way of shuttle buses from the Cruise Terminal to the City. Each bus has the capacity for up to 50 passengers, and there could be up to 10 No. shuttles per hour. Therefore, no passengers will be walking through the existing and new Galway Port Areas.

The development includes provision for a possible future marina village. Public access will be permitted along the Marina Village but will be restricted in the Quays and Jetty.

The layout of the proposed scheme is illustrated on Figure 1 and the location of the proposed scheme relative to the Circle K Fuel Terminal is illustrated on Figure 2.



Figure 1 Proposed Development Layout

2.2 Circle K Galway Terminal Upper Tier COMAH Site

Information on the Circle K Galway Fuel Terminal was provided by The Port of Galway.

The Circle K Galway Fuel Terminal is located in Galway Enterprise Business Park. The Terminal provides for the transfer of fuel from ship, storage in bulk fuel storage tanks and offload to road tankers. The following products are stored on site:

- KERO (kerosene)
- Gasoline
- ULSD (diesel)
- MGO (Medium gas oil)
- Ethanol

The facility is designed to import Ultra-low sulphur diesel (ULSD), kero (kerosene), MGO and gasoline from ships. It is also designed to receive ethanol from road tankers. The distance from the ship to the tank farm is 540 m. There is currently a proposal for operations at the fuel terminal to become unmanned during night time hours.

The site layout is illustrated on **Figure 2**.



Figure 2 Circle K Galway Terminal Layout

Pat Rynn Engineering is located to the west of the fuel terminal and Cold Chon Bitumen Terminal to the north west. It is noted that these facilities are not COMAH establishments and there are no major accident hazards associated with activities that take place at these businesses.

Details of the products currently notified to the HSA in Tanks 1 – 9 are provided in **Table 2**.

Tank	Product	Diameter (m)	Height (m)	Maximum Inventory (m^3)
1	Kerosene or Gasoline	30	13.2	8630
2	Kerosene or Gasoline	40	13.2	15495
3	ULSD	36	13.2	13245
4	ULSD	30	13.2	9155
5	Kerosene	9	13.2	765
6	ULSD	9	13.2	800
7	ULSD	9	13.2	800
8	Gasoline	9	13.2	760
9	Gasoline or Ethanol	11.5	13.2	1055

Table 2 Products in Tanks 1 – 9 at Circle K Galway Terminal

It is noted that Tank 1 and Tank 2 currently store kerosene. Tank 1 or Tank 2 may revert to gasoline storage in future and this gasoline scenario is considered in the assessment. Circle K are permitted by the HSA to store gasoline in Tank 1 or Tank 2 at any time. Tank 9 may contain gasoline or ethanol.

In addition, FAME additive is stored in 2 No. tanks of 50 m^3 capacity each.

ULSD, Kero and gasoline are transferred to the main tanks T1 to T4 from ships in the local harbour (approximately 300 m from the tank farm). Day tanks are provided so that tanker filling can be maintained whilst a ship is being unloaded. Road tankers can be loaded either from bulk tank or day tank at one of six purpose-built loading gantries. There is also provision to receive ethanol from road tankers into a day tank, T9. Ethanol is blended with gasoline at 5.75% – 10%. It is added directly to the road tanker at the gantry. There is provision for storage of FAME additive in 2 No. bulk storage tanks.

Table 3 provides information on the classification, hazard statements and flammable properties of products stored at Circle K Galway Terminal.

Substance	CAS #	Classification	Hazard Statements	Flash Point	Lower Flammability Limit	Upper Flammability Limit	Vapour pressure	Fire hazard
Kerosene (desulphurised)	64742-81-0	Flam. Liq. 3, Asp. Tox. 1, Skin Irr. 2, STOT SE 3, Aquatic Chronic 2	H226, H304, H315, H336, H411	> 38 ºC	0.5% Vol	7% Vol	0.1-30 hPa @ 20°C	Flammable material
Kerosene (petroleum)	8008-20-6							
Ultra Low Sulphur Diesel	64742-46-7	Asp. Tox. 1, Skin Irr. 2, STOT SE 3, Aquatic Chronic 2	H304, H315, H332, H411	> 61 ºC	0.5% Vol	7% Vol	< 1 hPa @ 20°C	Combustible material
Gasoline	86290-81-5	Flam. Liq. 1, Asp. Tox. 1, Skin Irr. 2, STOT SE 3, Muta 1, 1A or 1B, Carc. 1, 1A or 1B, Aquatic Chronic 2, Repr. 2	H224, H304, H315, H336, H340, H350, H411, H361fd	< -40 ºC	1.3 % Vol	7.7% Vol	450 - 1000 hPa @ 20°C	Extremely flammable material
Ethanol (L-(+)-Selenomethionine 99+ > 95%, Methanol < 2%)	3211-76-5	Acute Tox. 3, STOT RE 2	H301, H331, H373	-10.6 ºC	3.3% Vol	19% Vol	No data available	Highly flammable material
	67-56-1	Flam Liq. 2, Acute Tox. 3, STOT SE 1	H225, H311, H331, H301, H370					
FAME	67762-38-3	Not a hazardous substance or mixture	-	173 ºC	No data available	No data available	4.2 hPa @ 25 °C	Combustible material

Table 3 Classification and Hazards of Products Stored at Circle K Galway Terminal

Note 1: EUHO66 - Repeated exposure may cause skin dryness or cracking

Details of substance classifications and hazard statements included in **Table 3** are provided in **Table 3**.

Classification		Hazard Statements	
Flam. Liq. 1	Flammable liquid category 1 (flash point < 23 °C and initial boiling point ≤ 35 °C)	H224	Extremely flammable liquid and vapour
Flam Liq. 2	Flammable liquid category 2 (flash point < 23 °C and initial boiling point > 35 °C)	H225	Highly flammable liquid and vapour
Flam. Liq. 3	Flammable liquid category 3 (flash point ≥ 23 °C and ≤ 60 °C)	H226	Flammable liquid and vapour
Asp. Tox. 1	Aspiration toxicity category 1	H304	May be fatal if swallowed and enters airways
Acute Tox. 3	Acute toxicity category 3	H301 H311 H331	Toxic if swallowed Toxic in contact with skin Toxic if inhaled
Acute Tox. 4	Acute toxicity category 4	H302 H312 H332	Harmful if swallowed Harmful in contact with skin Harmful if inhaled
Skin Irr. 2	Skin irritation category 2	H315	Causes skin irritation
STOT SE 1	Specific target organ toxicity (single exposure) category 1	H370	Causes damage to organs
STOT SE 3	Specific target organ toxicity (single exposure) category 3	H335	May cause respiratory irritation
		H336	May cause drowsiness or dizziness
STOT RE 2	Specific target organ toxicity (repeated exposure) category 2	H373	May cause damage to organs through prolonged or repeated exposure
Muta 1, 1A or 1B	Germ cell mutagenicity category 1 and sub-category 1A and 1B	H340	May cause genetic defects
Carc 1, 1A or 1B	Carcinogenicity category 1 and sub-category 1A and 1B	H350	May cause cancer
Repr. 2	Reproductive toxicity category 2	H361fd	Suspected of damaging fertility. Suspected of damaging the unborn child.
Aquatic Chronic 2	Hazardous to the aquatic environment, chronic category 2	H411	Toxic to aquatic life with long lasting effects

Table 4 Details of Substance Classification and Hazard Statements

3.0 ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY AND CRITERIA

3.1 Risk Assessment – An Introduction

The Centre for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) has defined risk as (CCPS 2000): "Risk is a measure of human injury, environmental damage, or economic loss in terms of both the incident likelihood and the magnitude of the loss or injury."

Risk is a function of the consequences of an undesired event and how likely it is to occur. It is often expressed as the product of the likelihood and the consequences:

Risk = consequence x likelihood

In this form, risk has the units of losses per year.

Risk assessment in the chemical process sector seeks answers to the following questions:

- What are the hazards?
- What can go wrong (scenario)?
- How severe could it be (consequence)?
- How likely is it to happen (frequency)?
- How do consequence and frequency combine (risk)?
- Is the current level of risk tolerable, considering existing safeguards?
- If not, what needs to be done to reduce and manage the risk?

Risk assessment may be qualitative, semi-quantitative or quantitative, with the level of detail and analysis increasing from qualitative through to quantitative approaches. For COMAH establishments, the HSA Safety Report Assessment Guidelines (HSA, 2017) indicate that the depth of analysis should be proportionate to:

- the scale and nature of the major accident hazards presented by the establishment.
- the risk posed to neighbouring populations and the environment.

3.2 Land Use Planning and Risk Assessment

This land use planning assessment has been carried out in accordance with the HSA's Guidance on technical land-use planning advice (HSA, 2023). This approach involves delineating three zones for land use planning guidance purposes, based on the potential risk of fatality from major accident scenarios resulting in damaging levels of thermal radiation (e.g., from pool fires), overpressure (e.g., from vapour cloud explosions) and toxic gas concentrations (e.g., from an uncontrolled toxic gas release).

The HSA has defined the boundaries of the Inner, Middle and Outer Land Use Planning (LUP) zones as:

1E-05/year	Risk of fatality for Inner Zone (Zone 1) boundary
1E-06/year	Risk of fatality for Middle Zone (Zone 2) boundary
1E-07/year	Risk of fatality for Outer Zone (Zone 3) boundary

The process for determining the distances to the boundaries of the inner, middle and outer zones is outlined as follows:

- Determine the consequences of major accident scenarios using the modelling methodologies described in the HSA's Guidance on technical land-use planning advice (HSA, 2023).
- Determine the severity (probability of fatality) using the Probit functions specified by the HSA.
- Determine the frequency of the accident (probability of event) using data specified by the HSA.
- Determine the individual risk of fatality as follows:

Risk = Frequency x Severity ***(Equation 1)***

The HSA's Guidance on technical land-use planning advice (HSA, 2023) document provides guidance on the type of development appropriate to the inner, middle and outer LUP zones. The methodology sets four levels of sensitivity, with sensitivity increasing from 1 to 4, to describe the development types in the vicinity of a COMAH establishment.

The Sensitivity Levels used in the Land Use Planning Methodology are based on a rationale which allows progressively more severe restrictions to be imposed as the sensitivity of the proposed scheme increases. The sensitivity levels are:

Level 1	Based on normal working population;
Level 2	Based on the general public – at home and involved in normal activities;
Level 3	Based on vulnerable members of the public (children, those with mobility difficulties or those unable to recognise physical danger); and
Level 4	Large examples of Level 3 and large outdoor examples of Level 2 and Institutional Accommodation.

Table 4 details the matrix that is used by the HSA to advise on suitable development for technical LUP purposes:

Level of Sensitivity	Inner Zone (Zone 1)	Middle Zone (Zone 2)	Outer Zone (Zone 3)
Level 1	✓	✓	✓
Level 2	×	✓	✓
Level 3	×	×	✓
Level 4	×	×	×

Table 5 LUP Matrix

3.3 Individual Risk Criteria

In relation to new establishments, the HSA's Guidance on technical land-use planning advice (HSA, 2023) states that it will be necessary for them to demonstrate that they do not present a risk of fatality greater than 5E-06 (per year) to a person at an off-site work location or a risk of fatality greater than 1E-06 (per year) to a member of the public.

3.4 Environment and Land Use Planning

The HSA's Generic TLUP Guidelines (HSA, 2023) outlined that the prevention of MATTEs is the primary objective and it is expected that accident pathways will be prevented. Where this is not practicable, the assessment of major accidents to the environment focuses on the specific risks to sensitive receptors within the local environment, the extent of consequences to such receptors and the ability of such receptors to recover.

Assessment is based on a Source-Pathway-Receptor model. For new establishments, the CCA will focus on the removal of accident pathways to receptors (through the use of additional technical measures: appropriate containment, within the confines of current good practice and ALARP, for example).

4.0 LAND USE PLANNING ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY AND CRITERIA

This COMAH land use planning assessment has been completed in accordance with risk-based approach set out in the HSA's *Guidance on technical land-use planning advice* (HSA, 2023). LUP assessments are completed in the following steps:

- Identify major accident scenarios with reference to the HSA guidance document (HSA, 2023).
- Consequence modelling of major accident scenarios with physical consequences.
- Assign frequencies to major accident scenarios with reference to frequency values outlined in the HSA's Guidance document (HSA, 2023).
- Assessment of individual risk and generation of individual risk contours.
- Where necessary, assessment of societal risk using societal risk indices.
- Source-pathway-receptor model for major accident scenarios with environmental consequences, environmental receptor categorisation, assessment of MATTE harm and duration, compare MATTE frequency with tolerability criteria.

4.1 Assessment Methodology

4.1.1 Physical Effects Modelling

The impacts of physical and health effects on workers and the general public outside of the establishment boundary were determined by modelling accident scenarios using Gexcon Effects version 12.3.0 modelling software.

4.1.2 Risk Assessment Methodology

Gexcon RiskCurves version 12.3.0 modelling software is used in this assessment to calculate individual risk of fatality contours and risk-based land use planning zones associated with major accident scenarios.

4.1.3 Thermal Radiation Criteria

Fire scenarios have the potential to create hazardous heat fluxes. Therefore, thermal radiation on exposed skin poses a risk of fatality.

In relation to persons indoors, the HSA have specified the thermal radiation consequence criteria (from an outdoor fire) detailed in **Table 6** (HSA, 2023).

Thermal Flux (kW/m^2)	Consequences
> 25.6	Building conservatively assumed to catch fire quickly and so 100% fatality probability
> 25.6	People are assumed to escape outdoors, and so have a risk of fatality corresponding to that of people outdoors
< 12.7	People are assumed to be protected, and therefore there is a 0% fatality probability

Table 6 Heat Flux Consequences Indoors

In relation to property and equipment damage, the HSA have specified the thermal radiation consequence criteria (from an outdoor fire) detailed in **Table 7** (HSA, 2023).

Thermal Flux (kW/m^2)	Consequences
37.5	Building conservatively assumed to catch fire quickly and so 100% fatality probability
25.6	People are assumed to escape outdoors, and so have a risk of fatality corresponding to that of people outdoors
14.7	People are assumed to be protected, and therefore there is a 0% fatality probability

Table 7 Heat Flux Consequences to Property and Equipment

Thermal Dose Unit (TDU) is used to measure exposure to thermal radiation. It is a function of intensity (power per unit area) and exposure time:

$$\text{Thermal Dose} = I^{1.33}\, t \qquad \text{(Equation 2)}$$

where the Thermal Dose Units (TDUs) are $(kW/m^2)^{4/3}.s$, I is thermal radiation intensity (kW/m^2) and t is exposure duration (s).

The HSA recommends that the Eisenberg Probit function (HSA, 2023) is used to determine probability of fatality to persons outdoors from thermal radiation as follows:

$$\text{Probit} = -14.9 + 2.56 \ln (I^{1.33}\, t) \qquad \text{(Equation 3)}$$

I Thermal radiation intensity (kW/m^2)
t exposure duration (s)

Probit (Probability Unit) functions are used to convert the probability of an event occurring to percentage certainty that an event will occur. The Probit variable is related to probability as follows (CCPS, 2000):

$$P = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}} \int_{-\infty}^{Y-5} \exp\left(-\frac{u^2}{2}\right) du \qquad \text{(Equation 4)}$$

where P is the probability of percentage, Y is the Probit variable, and u is an integration variable. The Probit variable is normally distributed and has a mean value of 5 and a standard deviation of 1.

The Probit to percentage conversion equation is (CCPS, 2000):

$$P = 50\left[1 + \frac{Y-5}{|Y-5|} erf\left(\frac{|Y-5|}{\sqrt{2}}\right)\right] \qquad \text{(Equation 5)}$$

The relationship between Probit and percentage certainty is presented in **Table 8** (CCPS, 2000).

%	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
0	—	2.67	2.95	3.12	3.25	3.36	3.45	3.52	3.59	3.66
10	3.72	3.77	3.82	3.87	3.92	3.96	4.01	4.05	4.08	4.12
20	4.16	4.19	4.23	4.26	4.29	4.33	4.36	4.39	4.42	4.45
30	4.48	4.50	4.53	4.56	4.59	4.61	4.64	4.67	4.69	4.72
40	4.75	4.77	4.80	4.82	4.85	4.87	4.90	4.92	4.95	4.97
50	5.00	5.03	5.05	5.08	5.10	5.13	5.15	5.18	5.20	5.23
60	5.25	5.28	5.31	5.33	5.36	5.39	5.41	5.44	5.47	5.50
70	5.52	5.55	5.58	5.61	5.64	5.67	5.71	5.74	5.77	5.81
80	5.84	5.88	5.92	5.95	5.99	6.04	6.08	6.13	6.18	6.23
90	6.28	6.34	6.41	6.48	6.55	6.64	6.75	6.88	7.05	7.33
%	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.9
99	7.33	7.37	7.41	7.46	7.51	7.58	7.65	7.75	7.88	8.09

Table 8 Conversion from Probit to Percentage

For long duration fires, such as pool fires, it is generally reasonable to assume an effective exposure duration of 60 seconds to take account of the time required to escape (HSA, 2023). It is noted that this is a conservative estimation of the time taken to escape and is used in consequence assessment as the maximum exposure duration for heat radiation.

With respect to exposure to thermal radiation outdoors, the Eisenberg Probit relationship implies:

- 1% fatality – 963 TDUs (8.02 kW/m^2 for 60 s exposure duration)
- 10% fatality – 1450 TDUs (10.9 kW/m^2 for 60 s exposure duration)
- 50% fatality – 2399 TDUs (15.9 kW/m^2 for 60 s exposure duration)

4.1.4 Overpressure Criteria

Explosions scenarios can result in damaging overpressures, especially when flammable vapour/air mixtures are ignited in a congested area.

Combustion of a flammable gas-air mixture will occur if the composition of the mixture lies in the flammable range and if an ignition source is available. When ignition occurs in a flammable region of the cloud, the flame will start to propagate away from the ignition source. The combustion products expand causing flow ahead of the flame. Initially this flow will be laminar. Under laminar or near laminar conditions the flame speeds for normal hydrocarbons are in the order of 5 to 30 m/s which is too low to produce any significant blast over-pressure. Under these conditions, the vapour cloud will simply burn, causing a flash fire. In order for a vapour cloud explosion to occur, the vapour cloud must be in a turbulent condition.
Turbulence may arise in a vapour cloud in various ways:

- By the release of the flammable material itself, for instance a jet release from a high-pressure vessel.
- By the interaction of the expansion flow ahead of the flame with obstacles present in a congested area.

Table 9 below describes blast damage for various overpressure levels (HSA, 2023).

Side-on Overpressure (mbar)	Description of Damage
1.5	Annoying noise
2	Occasional breaking of large windowpanes already under strain
3	Loud noise; sonic boom glass failure
7	Breakage of small windows under strain
10	Threshold for glass breakage
20	“Safe distance”, probability of 0.95 of no serious damage beyond this value; some damage to house ceilings; 10% window glass broken
30	Limited minor structural damage
35 – 70	Large and small windows usually shattered; occasional damage to window frames
>35	Damage level for “Light Damage”
50	Minor damage to house structures
80	Partial demolition of houses, made uninhabitable
70 – 150	Corrugated asbestos shattered. Corrugated steel or aluminium panels fastenings fail, followed by buckling; wood panel (standard housing) fastenings fail; panels blown in
100	Steel frame of clad building slightly distorted
150	Partial collapse of walls and roofs of houses
150-200	Concrete or cinderblock walls, not reinforced, shattered
>170	Damage level for “Moderate Damage”
180	Lower limit of serious structural damage 50% destruction of brickwork of houses
200	Heavy machines in industrial buildings suffered little damage; steel frame building distorted and pulled away from foundations
200 – 280	Frameless, self-framing steel panel building demolished; rupture of oil storage tanks
300	Cladding of light industrial buildings ruptured
350	Wooden utility poles snapped; tall hydraulic press in building slightly damaged
350 – 500	Nearly complete destruction of houses
>350	Damage level for “Severe Damage”
500	Loaded tank car overturned
500 – 550	Unreinforced brick panels, 25 – 35 cm thick, fail by shearing or flexure
600	Loaded train boxcars completely demolished
700	Probable total destruction of buildings; heavy machine tools moved and badly damaged
830	Damage level for ‘total destruction’

Table 9 *Blast Damage Overpressures*

The HSA recommends that the Hurst, Nussey and Pape Probit function (HSA, 2023) is used to determine probability of fatality to persons outdoors from overpressure as follows:

$$\textbf{Probit} = 1.47 + 1.35 \ln P$$

P Blast overpressure (psi)

The Hurst, Nussey and Pape Probit relationship implies:

- 1% fatality – 168 mbar
- 10% fatality – 365 mbar
- 50% fatality – 942 mbar

The HSA uses relationships published by the Chemical Industries Association (CIA) and the American Petroleum Institute (API) to determine the probability of fatality for building occupants exposed to blast overpressure. The CIA has developed relationships for 4 categories of buildings (CIA, 2020):

- CIA 1: hardened structure building (special construction, no windows).
- CIA 2: typical office block (four storey, concrete frame and roof, brick block wall panels).
- CIA 3: typical domestic dwelling (two storey, brick walls, timber floors); and
- CIA 4: ‘portacabin’ type timber construction, single storey.

The API has developed relationships for 5 categories of buildings (EIGA, 2014):

- API B1: Wood frame trailer or shack
- API B2: Steel frame/metal siding or pre-engineered building
- API B3: Unreinforced masonry bearing wall building
- API B4: Steel or concrete reinforced masonry infill or cladding
- API B5: Reinforced concrete or reinforced masonry shear wall building

Figure 3 illustrates the probability of occupant vulnerability to overpressure in CIA building categories CIA 1 – 4 and in API building types B1 – B5.



Graph Key:	
	CIA 1: Hardened structure building: special construction, no windows
	CIA 2: Typical office block: four story, concrete frame and roof, brick block wall panels
	CIA 3: Typical domestic buildings: two story, brick walls, timber floors
	CIA 4: Portacabin: timber construction, single story
	API B5: Reinforced concrete or reinforced masonry shear wall building
	API B3: Unreinforced masonry bearing wall building
	API B1, B2, B4: Wood frame trailer or shack, steel-frame/metal siding or pre-engineered building, steel or concrete reinforced masonry infill or cladding
NOTE—Building key items 1 - 4 are defined by CIA; items B1 - B5 are defined by API RP 752 (2003) [5, 3].	

Figure 3 API Probability of Occupant Vulnerability

The CIA and API relationships imply the overpressure levels corresponding to probabilities of fatality of 1%, 10% and 50% detailed in **Table 10** below.

Probability of fatality	Overpressure Level, mbar						
	CIA 1	CIA 2	CIA 3	CIA 4	API B1 B2 and B4	API B3	API B5
1% fatality	435	100	50	50	-	-	-
10% fatality	519	183	139	115	69	69	276
50% fatality	590	284	300	242	172	97	483

Table 10Blast Overpressure Consequences Indoors

The proposed development buildings will comprise of 1, 2 and 3 storey buildings. Therefore, as a conservative assumption the overpressure vulnerability of CIA

Category 3 buildings is assumed to be representative of buildings at the proposed development.

4.1.5 Flash Fire Criteria

A flash fire comprises the combustion of a flammable vapour and air mixture in which the flame passes through that mixture at less than sonic velocity, such that negligible damaging overpressure is generated.

The flash fire envelope is the lower flammable limit (LFL) concentration, determined using the unified dispersion model in PHAST Version 9.0 consequence modelling software.

For flash fires, fatality levels of 100% are assumed inside the lower flammable limit (LFL) envelope, with 0% fatalities outside that envelope. For flash fire, within the flash fire envelope, indoor fatality levels are conservatively assumed to be 10%. (HSA, 2023)

4.2 Modelling Parameters

4.2.1 Weather Conditions

Weather conditions at the time of a major-accident have a significant impact on the consequences of the event. Typically, high wind speeds slightly increase the impact of fires, particularly pool fires.

Atmospheric Stability Class and Wind Speed

In order to adequately assess the consequences of a major-accident, weather conditions must be selected that represent the weather experienced at the site. The standard atmospheric stability classes are listed in **Table 11.**

A-G Stability	Conditions	Typically observed during
A	Very unstable – Sunny with light winds	Day-time
B	Unstable – Less sunny or more windy than A	Day-time
C	Moderately unstable – Very windy/sunny or overcast/light wind	Day-time
D	Neutral – little sun and high wind or overcast/windy night	Day or Night-time
E	Moderately stable – Less overcast and less windy than D	Night-time
F	Stable – Night with moderate clouds and light/moderate winds	Night-time
G	Very Stable – Possibly Fog	Night-time

Table 11 Atmospheric Stability Classes

For TLUP purposes, the HSA specifies that D_5 conditions are assumed to occur 80% of the time, with F2 occurring for the remaining 20% (HSA, 2023).

4.2.2 Wind Direction

The nearest weather station to Galway Harbour at which hourly wind speed and direction measurements are taken is at Athenry Station. Figure 4 illustrates a wind rose based on hourly wind speed and direction data for Athenry Weather Station

(2011 – 2018). Data was obtained from the Met Eireann website. It can be seen that the prevailing wind direction is approximately from the south west (250 °).



Figure 4 Wind Rose Athenry Weather Station 2011 - 2018

Ambient Temperature

The ambient and surface temperature conditions significantly impact the results of the consequence modelling.

The nearest meteorological station at which long term climate data is available is at Claremorris, approximately 50 km from the proposed scheme site. Typically, atmospheric temperatures at this station area range from -12.9°C to 30.5°C through the year.

For TLUP purposes the HSA specifies that Outdoor storage vessel contents are assumed to be at ambient atmospheric temperatures. Ambient temperatures vary throughout the day and the seasons. For TLUP purposes, a temperature of 15 °C is used in D_5 conditions and 10 °C for F2 conditions. (HSA, 2023).

Ambient Humidity

An ambient humidity of 60% is assumed for TLUP assessments.

4.2.3 Surface Roughness

Surface roughness describes the roughness of the surface over which the cloud is dispersing. Typical values for the surface roughness are as follows (DNV PHAST Technical Reference Documentation):

Roughness length	Description
0.0002 m	Open water, at least 5 km
0.005 m	Mud flats, snow, no vegetation
0.03 m	Open flat terrain, grass, few isolated objects
0.1 m	Low crops, occasional large obstacles, x/h > 20
0.25 m	High crops, scattered large objects, 15 < x/h < 20
0.5 m	Parkland, bushes, numerous obstacles, x/h < 15
1.0 m	Regular large obstacles coverage (suburb, forest)
3.0 m	City centre with high and low rise buildings

Table 12 Surface Roughness

By default, for general terrain without defining features, a value of 0.1 m will be used (a conservative approach) (HSA, 2023).

4.3 Societal Risk Assessment Methodology

Where a large population is potentially exposed to the consequences of a major accident, and there is the potential for multiple fatalities from a single event, societal risk is taken into account.

To take account of societal risk, the HSA will initially obtain an estimate of the expectation value.

Expectation Value and FN Curve

The Expectation Value (EV) is the average number of persons receiving a specified level of harm. Hirst and Carter (Hirst et al., 2000) shows that:

$$\boldsymbol{EV = F \times N}$$

Where F is the cumulative frequency of all events leading to N fatalities

HSE (2001) provides an upper limit value for an intolerable societal risk criterion: for a predicted accident occurring no more frequently than once in 5,000 years, there should be no more than 50 fatalities. This has gained international acceptance as an anchor point for a line (of slope -1) to create an intolerable societal risk criterion for single accidents. HSA Guidance on Technical Land Use Planning recommended using points at 200 cpm / 50 fatalities and 1000 cpm/10 fatalities to create that line. An acceptable societal risk single risk criterion line can then be drawn at frequencies that are two orders of magnitude below the intolerable line (so a frequency of 1×10^{-4} on the intolerable line becomes 1×10^{-6} on the acceptable line).

Some establishments will have the potential for fatalities to arise from a multiplicity of accident scenarios (or there may be other establishments in the vicinity, adding to the EV). In such situations, the total off-site EV should not exceed the criterion upper limit EV of 10,000. Between EVs of 100 and 10,000, it should be demonstrated that all practicable efforts have been made to reduce the risk to a level that is as low as reasonably practicable (above a developmental EV level of 450, an FN curve will be required as part of the demonstration).

5.0 IDENTIFICATION OF MAJOR ACCIDENT HAZARDS

A major accident is defined in the 2015 COMAH Regulations as:

> *"an occurrence such as a major emission, fire, or explosion resulting from uncontrolled developments in the course of the operation of any establishment covered by these Regulations, and leading to serious danger to human health or the environment, immediate or delayed, inside or outside the establishment, and involving one or more dangerous substances"*

As detailed in Section 2.2, the following products are stored in bulk storage tanks at the Circle K terminal:

- KERO (kerosene) – Category 3 flammable liquid (Tank 1/2 and 5)
- Gasoline – Category 0 flammable liquid (Tank 1/2, Tank 8 and 9)
- ULSD (diesel) – Category 3 flammable liquid (Tank 3, 4, 6, 7)
- Ethanol – Category 2 flammable liquid (Tank 9)

Tank 1 and Tank 2 currently store kerosene. Tank 1 or Tank 2 may revert to gasoline storage in future and this gasoline scenario is considered. Circle K are permitted by the HSA to store gasoline in Tank 1 or Tank 2 at any time. Tank 9 may contain gasoline or ethanol.

A conservative approach is adopted and the following tank contents are included in the study.

- Tank 1: Kerosene
- Tank 2: Gasoline (largest of tanks 1 and 2)
- Tank 3: ULSD
- Tank 4: ULSD
- Tank 5: Kerosene
- Tank 6: ULSD
- Tank 7: ULSD
- Tank 8: Gasoline
- Tank 9: Gasoline (more conservative than ethanol due to higher vapour pressure and lower flash point of gasoline)

Table 13 lists the loss of containment (LOC) scenarios to be modelled for single containment atmospheric storage tanks storing Ignition Category 0 substances. This applies to Tank 2, 8 and 9 (gasoline) (HSA, 2023).

Ignition probabilities for Category 3 substances (kero and ULSD) are zero. Fire and explosion events are not considered for Category 3 substances, unless they are co-located in the same bund as Category 1 or Category 2 substances, in which case they could be modelled as Category 1 or Category 2 substances.

At Circle K, Kero and ULSD are co located in the same bund as ethanol (Category 2 substance). **Table 14** lists the loss of containment (LOC) scenarios to be modelled for single containment atmospheric storage tanks storing Ignition Category 3 substances (kerosene/ULSD) that are co-located in the same bund as bulk storage tanks containing Ignition Category 2 substances. A pool fire hazard is assumed to apply to kero/ULSD and VCE/flash fire hazards are screened out.

In relation to road tankers, full tankers are not parked up on site, therefore loss of containment scenarios associated with road tanker loading/unloading activities are considered for gasoline road tankers.

Installation	LOC scenario	Consequence	Event #
Tank 2 – bulk gasoline storage tank, 15,495 m^3	Instantaneous failure	Pool fire – within bund	001
		Poo fire – uncontained adjacent to bund	002
		VCE	003
		Flash fire	004
	Continuous leak over 10 minutes	Pool fire	005
		VCE	006
		Flash fire	007
	10 mm pipe leak over 30 minutes	Pool fire	008
		VCE	009
		Flash fire	010
Tank 8 /9 – bulk gasoline storage tank, 760 m^3/1150 m^3	Instantaneous failure	Pool fire – within bund	001
		Poo fire – uncontained adjacent to bund	002
		VCE	011
		Flash fire	012
	Continuous leak over 10 minutes	Pool fire	013
		VCE	014
		Flash fire	015
	10 mm pipe leak over 30 minutes	Pool fire	016
		VCE	017
		Flash fire	018
Gasoline road tanker (loading area)	Rupture of loading/unloading arm	Pool fire	019
		VCE	020
		Flash fire	021
	Leak of unloading arm 10% of diameter	Pool fire	022
		VCE	023
		Flash fire	024

Table 13Loss of Containment Scenarios and Consequences for Gasoline

Installation	LOC scenario	Consequence	Event #
Tank 1-7 – bulk kero/ULSD	Instantaneous failure	Pool fire – within bund	025
		Pool fire – uncontained adjacent to bund	026
	Continuous leak over 10 minutes	Pool fire	027
	10 mm pipe leak over 30 minutes	Pool fire	028

Table 14Loss of Containment Scenarios and Consequences for Kero/ULSD

6.0 ASSESSMENT OF MAJOR ACCIDENT HAZARDS FOR IGNITION CATEGORY 0 SUBSTANCES – GASOLINE

6.1 Gasoline Loss of Containment Scenarios

Currently, there are 2 No. bulk storage tanks at Circle K containing gasoline which is classified as ignition category 0 (Tank 8 and Tank 9). Tank 2 may revert to gasoline storage in the future. Table 13 lists the loss of containment scenarios including catastrophic tank rupture, failure over 10 minutes, 10 mm diameter leak over 30 minutes and road tanker loss of containment. Consequence modelling of pool fire, vapour cloud explosion and flash fire scenarios is described in the following sections.

The total bund area is given in the Safety Report for the fuel terminal as 11,695 m^2.

In the event of catastrophic failure of Tank 8/9 or Tank 2, the pool area is taken as the area within the bund, excluding remaining tanks.

In the event of bund overtopping, due to the lack of information on the surrounding topography, the maximum pool size of 100m diameter will be used, as given in the TLUP guidance document (Section 2.7, HSA, 2023).

For a tank leak scenario, the leaking tank remains intact; therefore, occupies space within the bund. Therefore, the pool area is taken as the area within the bund, excluding the tanks, and is calculated as 7665 m^2.

In relation to gasoline road tankers, Table 13 lists the loss of containment scenarios including rupture of the loading/unloading arm or leak of the loading/unloading arm (10% of diameter). Consequence modelling of pool fire, vapour cloud explosion and flash fire scenarios is described in the following sections.

6.2 Tank 2 or 8/9 LOC and Gasoline Pool Fire Scenarios

In the event of rupture of a bulk fuel storage tank (and bund overtopping) there is the potential for the released material to form a pool which on ignition could result in an uncontained pool fire. Alternatively, a pool may form within the bund which would result in a bund fire on direct ignition. As outlined above in Section 6.1, the maximum pool radius for both scenarios is 50 m. As per Table 13, a continuous leak over 10 minutes or a 10 mm pipe leak over 30 minutes have the potential to result in a pool fire within the bund.

6.2.1 Pool Fire Model Inputs

Pool fire model inputs are summarised in Table 15. Tank 9 contains a larger volume of gasoline than tank 8; therefore, selected as the representative source for gasoline loss of containment scenarios in the day tank bund.

Parameter	Units	Tank 2 (Main bund)			Tank 9 (Day tank bund)		
Scenario	-	Catastrophic rupture	Failure over 10 minutes (fixed duration release)	10 mm leak over 30 minutes	Catastrophic rupture	Failure over 10 minutes (fixed duration release)	10 mm leak over 30 minutes
Substance	-	Gasoline (modelled as n-pentane)					
Tank diameter	m	40	40	40	9	9	9
Liquid volume	m^3	15495	15495	15495	1055	1055	1055
Liquid height	m	12.3	12.3	12.3	10.2	10.2	10.2
Weather conditions	-	D5: 5 m/s windspeed & 15 ^{0}C F2: 2 m/s windspeed & 10 ^{0}C					
Max. pool dia.	m	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table 15Gasoline LOC from Bulk Storage: Pool Fire Model Inputs

Pentane is used as a surrogate for gasoline with the maximum SEP set at 130 kW/m^2. The two-zone pool fire model in DNV PHAST Version 9.0 and Gexcon Effects Version 12.3.0 modelling software were used to model the consequences of pool fire involving gasoline (modelled as pentane).

6.2.2 Pool Fire Model Outputs

Pool fire model outputs are summarised in Table 16.

Parameter	Units	Catastrophic rupture/ Failure over 10 minutes		10 mm leak over 30 minutes	
		D5	F2	D5	F2
Pool fire diameter (late pool fire)	m	100	100	10.3 m	13.2 m
Pool fire flame length	m	118	115	24.4	28.1
Total burn rate	kg/s	862	838	9.11	14.55
Radiative fraction	-	0.0232	0.0233	0.195	0.205

Table 16Gasoline LOC Scenarios: Tank 9 Pool Fire Model Outputs

6.2.3 Pool Fire Thermal Radiation Consequences

Modelling parameters are as described in Section 4.2. The receiver height was specified as 1.5 m.

Thermal radiation vs. distance downwind is illustrated on Figure 5. The catastrophic tank failure scenario results in a 100 m diameter pool fire outside of the bund or inside the bund (also 100 m diameter based on bund dimensions). The tank failure over 10 minutes scenario results in a 100 m diameter pool fire within the bund. The 10 mm leak over 30 minutes scenario results in a 10.3 m / 13.2 m (D5 / F2) diameter pool fire scenario inside the bund.



Figure 5 Gasoline LOC and Pool Fire: Thermal Radiation vs. Distance

Thermal radiation results are summarised in Table 17. The outdoor mortality consequence is based on the Eisenberg probit equation (see Section 4.1.3) and an exposure duration of 60 s.

Thermal radiation level, kW/m^2	Consequences	Distance (m)			
		Catastrophic rupture/ Failure over 10 minutes		10 mm leak over 30 minutes	
		D5	F2	D5	F2
8.02	1% mortality outdoors	105	103	40	46
12.7	Persons indoors protected	90	87	35	38
25.6	100% fatality indoors	72	74	25	26

Table 17 Gasoline LOC and Pool Fire: Thermal Radiation Results

The worst-case 1% mortality outdoors contour is illustrated on Figure 6 for the worst case bund fire.

In the event of rupture of Tank 2, there is the potential for the released liquid to overtop the bund to the north or to the east. A pool fire centred 50 m to the east of the bund has greater potential for impacts at the proposed development than a pool fire centred 50 m to the north of the bund. Figure 8 illustrates the 1% outdoor mortality contour, centred 50 m to the east of the bund.

In the event of rupture of Tank 8 or 9 there is the potential for the released liquid to overtop the bund to the south. The 1% mortality outdoors contour centred 50 m to the south of the bund is illustrated on Figure 8.

The shape of the contour is shown for the prevailing wind direction as well as the effect zone which takes account of all possible wind directions.



Figure 6 Gasoline Bund Fire: Case 1% Mortality Outdoors Contour Category D5



Figure 7 Gasoline Uncontained Fire to East of Bund: 1% Mortality Outdoors Contour D5



Figure 8 Gasoline Uncontained Pool Fire to South of Bund: 1% Mortality Outdoors Contour D5

The following is concluded:

- The thermal radiation level corresponding to the 1% mortality outdoors, for an uncontained pool fire to the south, extends to the Rail Link and the Renmore Promenade at the proposed development.
- The thermal radiation level below which persons in indoor locations are protected does not extend to the buildings of the proposed development, persons indoors at this location are protected from the thermal radiation consequences of a pool fire at the Circle K terminal.

6.3 Tank 2, 8 or 9 LOC and Gasoline Vapour Cloud Explosion Scenarios

In the event of ignition of a flammable cloud of vapour following a major release of gasoline, there is the potential for a vapour cloud explosion to occur with damaging levels of peak overpressure. Tank 9 contains a larger volume of gasoline than Tank 8 and is therefore selected as the representative source for gasoline loss of containment scenarios in the day tank bund.

6.3.1 VCE Model Inputs

Table 18 details the model inputs for a storage tank LOC and VCE.

Parameter	Units	Value	Source
Chemical name	-	Gasoline, modelled as n-pentane	-
Temperature	°C	10 (F2) 15 (D5)	HSA guidance (HSA, 2023)
Inventory	m^3	15,495 (Tank 2) 1055 (Tank 9)	GHC
Maximum pool size (Tank 2 LOC scenarios)	m^2	8922 m^2 in bund 7854 m^2 adjacent to bund 7665 m^2 in bund	rupture scenario rupture scenario (overtop) leak scenario
Maximum pool size (Tank 9 LOC scenarios)	m^2	7752 m^2 in bund 7854 m^2 adjacent to bund 7665 m^2 in bund	rupture scenario rupture scenario (overtop) leak scenario
Surface roughness	m	0.1	HSA guidance (HSA, 2023)
Explosion strength	-	7 for 20% of cloud volume	HSA guidance (HSA, 2023)
Combustion energy	MJ/m^3	3.5	HSA guidance (HSA, 2023)
Ignition location	-	60 m downwind	Distance from centre of bund to site roadway which ignition may be initiated by a vehicle

Table 18 Gasoline Bulk Storage Tank LOC and VCE: Model Inputs

The pool source for the tank rupture and bund overtopping scenario is the sum of the pool source within the bund (rupture scenario) + the pool source adjacent to the bund (overtop).

6.3.2 Flammable Mass

The unified dispersion model in DNV PHAST Version 9.0 determined the following maximum flammable mass for each loss of containment scenario:

Tank	LOC Scenario	Flammable mass Category D5 (kg)	Flammable Mass Category F2 (kg)
Tank 2	Catastrophic Rupture	1526	1501
	Failure over 10 minutes	192	170
	10 mm diameter leak	No VCE hazard	No VCE hazard
Tank 9	Catastrophic Rupture	377	350
	Failure over 10 minutes	130	208
	10 mm diameter leak	No VCE hazard	No VCE hazard

Table 19 Gasoline LOC and VCE: Model Inputs

6.3.3 VCE Overpressure Consequence Results

Figure 9 illustrates overpressure vs. distance for Tank 2 loss of containment scenarios. In the event of a 10 mm diameter leak, the lower flammable limit is not reached at the identified ignition location (60 m downwind from the release) and no VCE hazard arises.

Figure 10 illustrates overpressure vs. distance for Tank 9 loss of containment scenarios. In the event of a 10 mm diameter leak, the lower flammable limit is not reached at the identified ignition location (60 m downwind from the release) and no VCE hazard arises.



Figure 9 Tank 2 Gasoline LOC: VCE Overpressure vs. Distance



Figure 10 Tank 9 Gasoline LOC: VCE Overpressure vs. Distance

Table 20 details the distances to overpressure levels associated with specified levels of damage and mortality to persons outdoors and indoors arising from Tank 2 loss of containment scenarios.

Table 21 details the distances to overpressure levels associated with specified levels of damage and mortality to persons outdoors and indoors arising Tank 9 loss of containment scenarios.

Definition of damage (Lees LPPI) / mortality (HNP Probit)	Overpressure level (mbar)	Catastrophic LOC scenario		Failure over 10 minutes	
		F2	D5	F2	D5
		Distance (m)	Distance (m)	Distance (m)	Distance (m)
Safe distance, probability of 0.95 of no serious damage beyond this value; some damage to house ceilings; 10% window glass broken	20	659	662	350	362
Light damage (minor building damage)	35	421	423	234	242
Moderate damage (structural damage starts)	170	159	160	108	110
Severe damage	350	121	121	91	91
Total destruction	830	87	87	75	75
Mortality Outdoors (Hurst Nussey Pape Probit)					
50% outdoors	942	78	78	69	68
10% outdoors	365	120	120	90	90
1% outdoors	168	160	160	108	110
Mortality indoors					
50% mortality, CIA 3	300	127	127	92	94
10% mortality, CIA 3	139	172	173	114	116
1% mortality, CIA 3	50	322	323	186	192

Table 20 Tank 2 Gasoline LOC and VCE: Overpressure Results

Definition of damage (Lees LPPI) / mortality (HNP Probit)	Overpressure level (mbar)	Catastrophic LOC scenario		Failure over 10 minutes	
		F2	D5	F2	D5
		Distance (m)	Distance (m)	Distance (m)	Distance (m)
Safe distance, probability of 0.95 of no serious damage beyond this value; some damage to house ceilings; 10% window glass broken	20	408	438	369	325
Light damage (minor building damage)	35	270	287	246	219
Moderate damage (structural damage starts)	170	117	122	110	104
Severe damage	350	96	98	92	87
Total destruction	830	80	78	76	74
Mortality Outdoors (Hurst Nussey Pape Probit)					
50% outdoors	942	75	75	72	70
10% outdoors	365	95	98	91	86
1% outdoors	168	117	122	110	104
Mortality indoors					
50% mortality, CIA 3	300	101	102	94	89
10% mortality, CIA 3	139	129	131	118	110
1% mortality, CIA 3	50	221	225	195	176

Table 21Tank 9 Gasoline LOC and VCE: Overpressure Results

The worst case VCE scenario is predicted to arise following catastrophic rupture of Tank 2 during D5 (day time) conditions. Overpressure contours are illustrated on Figure 11 (outdoor and indoor mortality contours).

The VCE scenario assumes vapour cloud drift and ignition of the flammable mass by a vehicle on the ring road and is centred at the western ring road area in order to conservatively predict impacts at the proposed development site.



Figure 11 Tank 2 Gasoline LOC and VCE: Outdoor and Indoor Mortality Contours

The following is concluded:

- The overpressure level corresponding to 1% mortality outdoors does not extend to occupied areas at the proposed development.
- The overpressure level corresponding to 1% mortality indoors in CIA 3 buildings extends to the edge of the Harbour Stores Building at the proposed development.
- It is possible that a VCE at the Circle K terminal following Tank 2 loss of containment could result in injury or fatality at the proposed development.

6.4 Tank 2 or 9 LOC and Gasoline Flash Fire Scenarios

6.4.1 Flash Fire Model Inputs

Parameter	Units	Value	Source
Chemical name	-	Gasoline, modelled as n-pentane	-
Temperature	°C	10 (F2) 15 (D5)	HSA guidance (HSA, 2023)
Inventory	m^3	15,495 (Tank 2) 760 (Tank 8)	GHC
Maximum pool size (Tank 2 LOC scenarios)	m^2	8922 m^2 in bund 7854 m^2 adjacent to bund 7665 m^2 in bund	rupture scenario rupture scenario (overtop) leak scenario
Maximum pool size (Tank 9 LOC scenarios)	m^2	7752 m^2 in bund 7854 m^2 adjacent to bund 7665 m^2 in bund	rupture scenario rupture scenario (overtop) leak scenario
Surface roughness	m	0.1	HSA guidance (HSA, 2023)

Table 22Tank 8 Gasoline LOC and Flash Fire: Model Inputs

The pool source for the tank rupture and bund overtopping scenario is the sum of the pool source within the bund (rupture scenario) + the pool source adjacent to the bund (overtop).

6.4.2 Flash Fire Envelope

The flash fire envelope is the maximum distance to the lower flammability limit. Distances are given at ground level which represents the worst case scenario for a ground source evaporating pool. Table 23 summarises the flash fire model outputs for Tank 2 and Tank 9 gasoline LOC scenarios. Figure 12 and Figure 13 and illustrate the worst case flash fire contours for Tank 2 and Tank 9 LOC scenarios respectively.

LOC Scenario	Flash Fire Envelope	
	Category D5	Category F2
Tank 2 Catastrophic failure	293 m	313 m
Tank 2 Failure over 10 minutes	353 m	586 m
Tank 2 10 mm diameter leak	20 m	20 m
Tank 9 Catastrophic failure	153 m	235 m
Tank 9 Failure over 10 minutes	226 m	339 m
Tank 9 10 mm diameter leak	19 m	19 m

Table 23Gasoline LOC and Flash Fire: Model Outputs



Figure 12 Tank 2 Gasoline LOC and Flash Fire: Worst Case Flash Fire Contour

Figure 13 Tank 9 Gasoline LOC and Flash Fire: Worst Case Flash Fire Contour

In the event of a LOC of gasoline from Tank 2, it is concluded that the worst case flash fire contour extends to the Marina Promenade, Marina Building, Harbour Stores, Rail Link, Renmore Promenade and Security Gatehouse of the proposed development. The probability of fatality outdoors is 100% within this footprint and the probability of fatality indoors is 10%. Persons are assumed to be indoors 90% of the time (HSA, 2023).

In the event of a LOC of gasoline from Tank 9, it is concluded that the worst case flash fire contour could extend to the Marina Promenade, Marina Building, Harbour Stores, Rail Link, Renmore Promenade and Security Gatehouse at the proposed development. The probability of fatality outdoors is 100% within this footprint and the probability of fatality indoors is 10%. Persons are assumed to be indoors 90% of the time (HSA, 2023).

6.5 Gasoline Road Tanker LOC and Pool Fire Scenarios

Consequence modelling results are presented for the worst case gasoline road tanker loss of containment scenario (loading arm rupture).

6.5.1 Pool Fire Model Inputs

Pool fire model inputs are summarised in Table 24.

Parameter	Units	Value
Substance	-	Gasoline (modelled as n-pentane)
Liquid volume	m^3	45
Loading arm diameter	mm	101.6
Length of pipeline	m	70
Weather conditions		D5: 5 m/s windspeed & 15 ^{0}C F2: 2 m/s windspeed & 10 ^{0}C
Maximum pool diameter	m	100 (conservative estimation)

Table 24Gasoline Road Tanker LOC Scenarios: Pool Fire Model Inputs

Pentane is used as a surrogate for gasoline with the maximum SEP set at 130 kW/m^2. The two-zone pool fire model in DNV PHAST Version 9.0 modelling software was used to model the consequences of pool fire involving gasoline (modelled as pentane).

6.5.2 Pool Fire Model Outputs

Pool fire model outputs are summarised in Table 25.

Parameter	Units	Loading arm rupture	
		D5	F2
Pool fire diameter	m	10	10
Pool fire flame length	m	24	24
Total burn rate	kg/s	8.7	8.8
Radiative fraction	-	0.113	0.111

Table 25 Gasoline Road Tanker LOC: Pool Fire Model Outputs

6.5.3 Pool Fire Thermal Radiation Consequences

Modelling parameters are as described in Section 4.2. The receiver height was specified as 1.5 m. Thermal radiation vs. distance downwind is illustrated on Figure 14.



Figure 14 Gasoline Road Tanker LOC and Pool Fire: Thermal Radiation vs. Distance

Thermal radiation results are summarised in Table 26. The outdoor mortality consequence is based on the Eisenberg probit equation and an exposure duration of 60 s.

Thermal radiation level, kW/m^2	Consequences	Distance (m)	
		Loading arm rupture	
		D5	F2
8.02	1% mortality outdoors	29	26
12.7	Persons indoors protected	22	20
25.6	100% fatality indoors	14	13

Table 26 Gasoline Road Tanker LOC and Pool Fire: Thermal Radiation Results

It is concluded that the thermal radiation level corresponding to the 1% mortality outdoors/indoors is confined to the road tanker loading bay area and does not reach the Circle K site boundary or the proposed development, persons outdoors/indoors at this location would not be exposed to harmful levels of thermal radiation.

6.6 Gasoline Road Tanker LOC and VCE Scenarios

In the event of ignition of a flammable cloud of vapour following a loss of containment of gasoline from a road tanker, there is the potential for a vapour cloud explosion to occur with damaging levels of peak overpressure.

6.6.1 VCE Model Inputs

Parameter	Units	Value	Source
Chemical name	-	Gasoline, modelled as n-pentane	-
Temperature	°C	10 (F2) 15 (D5)	HSA guidance (HSA, 2023)
Inventory	m^3	45	GHC
Maximum pool diameter	m	100	conservative estimation
Surface roughness	m	0.1	HSA guidance (HSA, 2023)
Explosion strength	-	7 for 20% of cloud volume	HSA guidance (HSA, 2023)
Combustion energy	MJ/m^3	3.5	HSA guidance (HSA, 2023)

Table 27Tank 8 Gasoline LOC and VCE: Model Inputs

The maximum pool diameter is specified as 100 m. As detailed in Section 6.5.2, the pool size is calculated as 10 m by the discharge model in PHAST Version 9.0.

6.6.2 Flammable Mass

The unified dispersion model in DNV PHAST Version 9.0 estimates a flammable mass of 1 kg for category D5 and 0.84 kg for category F2.

6.6.3 VCE Overpressure Consequence Results

Figure 15 illustrates overpressure vs. distance and Figure 16 illustrates impulse vs. distance for Tank 2 loss of containment scenarios. In the event of a 10 mm diameter leak for weather category D5, the lower flammable limit is not reached and no VCE hazard arises.



Figure 15 Gasoline Road Tanker LOC: VCE Overpressure vs. Distance



Figure 16 Tank 2 Gasoline LOC: VCE Pressure Impulse vs. Distance

Table 28 details the distances to overpressure levels associated with specified levels of damage and mortality to persons outdoors and indoors arising from Tank 2 loss of containment scenarios.

Definition of damage (Lees LPPI) / mortality (HNP Probit)	Overpressure level (mbar)	Loading Arm Rupture	
		D5	F2
		Distance (m)	Distance (m)
Safe distance, probability of 0.95 of no serious damage beyond this value; some damage to house ceilings; 10% window glass broken	20	62	60
Light damage (minor building damage)	35	41	40
Moderate damage (structural damage starts)	170	18	18
Severe damage	350	15	15
Total destruction	830	13	13
Mortality Outdoors (Hurst Nussey Pape Probit)			
50% outdoors	942	12	12
10% outdoors	365	15	15
1% outdoors	168	19	18
Mortality indoors			
50% mortality, CIA 3 (typical domestic dwelling)	300	16	16
10% mortality, CIA 3	139	20	19
1% mortality, CIA 3	50	33	32

Table 28Gasoline Road Tanker Loading Arm Rupture and VCE: Overpressure Results

The closest occupied buildings, to the Circle K terminal, at the proposed development are the Security Gatehouse and Harbour Stores. These are located *ca*. 220m to the south of the Tanker Unloading area. In the event of VCE following rupture of a gasoline road tanker loading arm, the distance the overpressure level corresponding to 1% mortality outdoors is 19 m / 18 m (Category D5 / F2) and the distance to the overpressure level corresponding to 1% mortality indoors in tall buildings is 22 m / 21 m (Category D5 / F2). The distance to the overpressure level corresponding to light damage is 41 m / 40 m (D5 / F2). It is not anticipated that this scenario would result in any injuries or fatalities at the proposed development.

6.7 Gasoline Road Tanker LOC and Flash Fire Scenarios

6.7.1 Flash Fire Model Inputs

Parameter	Units	Value	Source
Chemical name	-	Gasoline, modelled as n-pentane	-
Temperature	°C	10 (F2) 15 (D5)	HSA guidance (HSA, 2023)
Inventory	m^3	45	GHC
Maximum pool diameter	m	100	conservative assumption
Surface roughness	m	0.1	HSA guidance (HSA, 2023)

Table 29Gasoline Road Tanker Loading Arm Rupture and Flash Fire: Model Inputs

The maximum pool diameter is specified as 100 m. As detailed in Section 6.5.2, the pool size is calculated as 10 m by the discharge model in PHAST Version 9.0.

6.7.2 Flash Fire Envelope

The flash fire envelope is the distance to the lower flammability limit. The unified dispersion model in PHAST Version 9.0 predicts a flash fire envelope of 5 m. Therefore, no impacts are anticipated at the proposed development.

7.0 ASSESSMENT OF MAJOR ACCIDENT HAZARDS FOR IGNITION CATEGORY 3 SUBSTANCES – KERO AND ULSD

7.1 Kero or ULSD Loss of Containment Scenarios

There are 7 No. bulk storage tank at Circle K currently containing kero or ULSD which is classified as ignition category 3 (Tanks 1 – 7). The assessment is based on gasoline in Tank 2, and kerosene in Tank 1 and Tanks 3 – 7.

Ignition probabilities for Category 3 substances (kero and ULSD) are zero. Fire and explosion events are not considered for Category 3 substances, unless they are co-located in the same bund as Category 1 or Category 2 substances, in which case they could be modelled as Category 1 or Category 2 substances.

At Circle K, kero and ULSD are co located in the same bund as ethanol (Category 2 substance). **Table 14** lists the loss of containment (LOC) scenarios to be modelled for single containment atmospheric storage tanks storing Ignition Category 3 substances (kerosene/ULSD) that are co-located in the same bund as bulk storage tanks containing Ignition Category 2 substances. A pool fire hazard is assumed to apply to kero/ULSD and VCE/flash fire hazards are screened out.

The total bund area is given in the Safety Report for the fuel terminal as 11695 m^2.

In the event of catastrophic failure of Tanks 1 and 3 - 7, the pool size within the bund (excluding remaining tanks) is calculated as 7729 m^2, the equivalent radius is 50 m.

In the event of bund overtopping, the maximum pool size outside of the bund is given in the TLUP guidance document as 50 m radius (HSA, 2023).

For a tank leak scenario, the maximum pool size is 7665 m^2. For a 10 mm tank leak scenario the pool size is determined within the consequence modelling software by the discharge model.

7.2 Kero or ULSD Pool Fire Scenarios

In the event of rupture of a bulk storage tank (and bund overtopping) there is the potential for the released material to form a pool which on ignition could result in an uncontained pool fire. Alternatively a pool may form within the bund which would result in a bund fire on direct ignition. As outlined above, the maximum pool radius for both scenarios is 50 m. A continuous leak over 10 minutes or a 10 mm pipe leak over 30 minutes have the potential to result in a pool fire within the bund.

7.2.1 Pool Fire Model Inputs

Pool fire model inputs are summarised in Table 30.

Parameter	Units	Catastrophic rupture	Failure over 10 minutes	10 mm leak over 30 minutes
Substance	-	Kerosene / ULSD (modelled as xylene)	Kerosene / ULSD (modelled as xylene)	Kerosene / ULSD (modelled as xylene)
Tank diameter (largest tank, Tank 2)	m	40	40	40
Liquid volume	m^3	15495	15495	15495
Scenario		Catastrophic rupture	Fixed duration release 600 s	Leak, 10 mm
Weather conditions	-	D5: 5 m/s windspeed & 15 ^{0}C F2: 2 m/s windspeed & 10 ^{0}C		
Maximum pool diameter	m	100	100	100

Table 30 Bulk Storage LOC Scenarios: Pool Fire Model Inputs

Xylene is used as a surrogate for kerosene/ULSD with the maximum SEP set at 130 kW/m^2. The two-zone pool fire model in DNV PHAST Version 9.0 and Gexcon Effects Version 12.3.0 modelling software were used to model the consequences of pool fire involving kero/ULSD (modelled as m-xylene).

7.2.2 Pool Fire Model Outputs

Pool fire model outputs are summarised in Table 31.

Parameter	Units	Catastrophic rupture/ Failure over 10 minutes		10 mm leak over 30 minutes	
		D5	F2	D5	F2
Pool fire diameter	m	100	100	5.5 m after 30 minutes	4.5 m after 30 minutes
Pool fire flame length	m	48.7	48.7	6.5	6.4
Total burn rate	kg/s	201	201	0.61	0.61
Radiative fraction	-	0.56	0.56	0.94	0.93

Table 31Bulk Storage LOC Scenarios: Pool Fire Model Outputs

7.2.3 Pool Fire Thermal Radiation Consequences

Modelling parameters are as described in Section 4.2. The receiver height was specified as 1.5 m.

Thermal radiation vs. distance downwind is illustrated on Figure 17. The catastrophic tank failure scenario results in a 100 m diameter pool fire outside of the bund or inside the bund (also 100 m diameter based on bund dimensions). The tank failure over 10 minutes scenario results in a 100 m diameter pool fire within the bund. The 10 mm leak over 30 minutes scenario results in an 18.8 m diameter pool fire scenario inside the bund.



Figure 17 Bulk Storage LOC and Pool Fire: Thermal Radiation vs. Distance

Thermal radiation results are summarised in Table 32. The outdoor mortality consequence is based on the Eisenberg probit equation and an exposure duration of 60 s.

Thermal radiation level, kW/m^2	Consequences	Distance (m)			
		Catastrophic rupture/ Failure over 10 minutes		10 mm leak over 30 minutes	
		D5	F2	D5	F2
8.02	1% mortality outdoors	75	63	13	10
12.7	Persons indoors protected	58	50	10	8
25.6	100% fatality indoors	47	42	6	5

Table 32Bulk Storage LOC and Pool Fire: Thermal Radiation Results

A pool fire to the south of the bund is likely to have greatest impacts at the proposed development. The worst-case 1% mortality outdoors contour is illustrated on Figure 18 for the worst case bund fire. The shape of the contour is shown for the prevailing wind direction (see wind rose on Figure 4 as well as the effect area which takes account of all possible wind directions.



Figure 18 Kerosene Bund Fire: Worst Case 1% Mortality Outdoors Contour and Effect Area

The following is concluded:

- The thermal radiation level corresponding to the 1% mortality outdoors extends to the Rail Link at the proposed development. Persons outdoors at the Renmore Promenade could be exposed to harmful levels of thermal radiation;

8.0 EVENT FREQUENCIES

Event frequencies are as specified in HSA guidance (HSA, 2023) and are detailed in Table 33. The event frequencies for Category 0 flammable liquid loss of containment scenarios are applied to gasoline. The event frequencies for Category 2 flammable liquid pool fire scenarios are applied to kero/ULSD pool fire scenarios as the kero/ULSD tanks are co-located in the same bund as Tank 9 which may contain ethanol and which is classified as a Category 2 flammable liquid.

Road tankers are treated as road transport units (Table 24 of HSA guidance). Bulk tank filling by road tanker and road tanker loading are treated as loading/unloading operations as per Table 25 of HSA guidance (HSA, 2023). The loading hose rupture frequency is taken as 4E-06 per hour and the loading hose leak (10% of diameter) frequency is taken as 4E-05 per hour. No information is available on the number of road tanker movements; therefore road tanker loading is assumed to occur continuously (i.e. 8766 hours per year). The pool fire / VCE / flash fire frequencies are calculated in the event trees in Figure 19 (gasoline road tanker).

Installation	LOC scenario	Consequence	Event #	Frequency	Units
Tank 2 – bulk gasoline storage tank, 15,495 m^3	Instantaneous failure	Pool fire – within bund	001	9.96E-07	/year /tank
		Pool fire – uncontained adjacent to bund	002	9.96E-07	/year /tank
		VCE	003	1.82E-06	/year /tank
		Flash fire Indoors*	004a	4.91E-08	/year /tank
		Flash fire Outdoors*	004b	5.46E-08	/year /tank
	Continuous leak over 10 minutes	Pool fire	005	9.96E-07	/year /tank
		VCE	006	1.82E-06	/year /tank
		Flash fire Indoors*	007a	4.91E-08	/year /tank
		Flash fire Outdoors*	007b	5.46E-08	/year /tank
	10 mm pipe leak over 30 minutes	Pool fire	008	1.99E-05	/year /tank
		VCE	009	3.64E-05	/year /tank
		Flash fire Indoors	010a	9.81E-07	/year /tank
		Flash fire Outdoors	010b	1.09E-06	/year /tank
Tank 8/9 – bulk gasoline storage tank, 760 m^3 /1055 m3	Instantaneous failure	Pool fire – within bund	001	9.96E-07	/year /tank
		Poo fire – uncontained adjacent to bund	002	9.96E-07	/year /tank
		VCE	011	1.82E-06	/year /tank
		Flash fire Indoors*	012a	4.91E-08	/year /tank

Installation	LOC scenario	Consequence	Event #	Frequency	Units
		Flash fire Outdoors*	012b	5.46E-08	/year /tank
	Continuous leak over 10 minutes	Pool fire	013	9.96E-07	/year /tank
		VCE	014	1.82E-06	/year /tank
		Flash fire Indoors*	015a	4.91E-08	/year /tank
		Flash fire Outdoors	015b	5.46E-08	/year /tank
	10 mm pipe leak over 30 minutes	Pool fire	016	1.99E-05	/year /tank
		VCE	017	3.64E-05	/year /tank
		Flash fire Indoors	018a	9.81E-07	/year /tank
		Flash fire Outdoors	018b	1.09E-06	/year /tank
Gasoline road tanker (loading area)	Rupture of loading/unloading arm	Pool fire	019	1.84E-04	/year
		VCE	020	3.16E-05	/year
		Flash fire Indoors*	021a	4.26E-06	/year
		Flash fire Outdoors*	021b	4.73E-06	/year
	Leak of unloading arm 10% of diameter	Pool fire	022	1.84E-03	/year
		VCE	023	3.16E-04	/year
		Flash fire Indoors*	024a	4.73E-05	/year
		Flash fire Outdoors*	024b	4.26E-05	/year
Tank 1& 3-7 – bulk kero/ULSD	Instantaneous failure	Pool fire – within bund	025	5.00E-08	/year /tank
		Pool fire – uncontained adjacent to bund	026	5.00E-08	/year /tank
	Continuous leak over 10 minutes	Pool fire	027	5.00E-08	/year /tank
	10 mm pipe leak over 30 minutes	Pool fire	028	1.00E-06	/year /tank

Table 33 Event Frequencies

<u>Note 1: Flash Fire Frequency</u>

The TLUP Guidelines (HSA, 2023) states that persons are assumed to be indoors 90% of the time. The TLUP Guidelines also state that the probability of fatality within the flash fire envelope to persons indoors, is 10%. Therefore, for the purposes of this assessment, the frequency for a flash fire will be adjusted, from the frequency in the TLUP Guidelines, to account for persons outdoors and persons indoors, as follows:

- Outdoor Flash Fire: 100% fatality will be assumed for 10% of the time an adjustment of 0.1 (1 *x* 0.1)
- Indoor Flash Fire: 10% fatality will be assumed for 90% of the time: an adjustment of 0.09 (0.1 *x* 0.9)

Gasoline Hose rupture

Rupture of loading/unloading arm		
fills per year		no information availble
hours per fill		no information availble
hours per year	8766	hours - continuous
base freq	3.00E-08	per hour
	2.63E-04	per year



Gasoline Hose leak

Leak of loading/unloading arm 10% diamter		
fills per year		no information availble
hours per fill		no information availble
hours per year	8766	hours - continuous
base freq	3.00E-07	per hour
	2.63E-03	per year



Figure 19 Event Trees for Gasoline Road Tanker Loading/Unloading Operations

In Figure 19, the probability of direct/delayed ignition and the explosion fraction (VCE/flash fire) is as per HSA guidance (HSA, 2023).

9.0 LAND USE PLANNING RISK CONTOURS

Gexcon Riskcurves Version 12.3.0 modelling software was used to model the cumulative risk contours for the Circle K establishment.

The consequence results, frequencies of major accident hazards and Athenry synoptic station wind speed and frequency data (see Figure 4) were input to the software. The fraction for D5 (daytime conditions) was 0.8 and the fraction for F2 night time conditions was 0.2.

The individual risk contours, to persons outdoors and persons indoors (CIA 3), for the Circle K upper tier COMAH establishment corresponding to the boundaries of the Inner, Middle and Outer risk-based land use planning zones are illustrated on Figure 20 and Figure 21.

Figure 20 Individual Risk of Fatality Contours, to Persons Outdoors, for Circle K Galway Terminal

Figure 21 Individual Risk of Fatality Contours, to Persons Indoors (CIA 3), for Circle K Galway Terminal

The following is concluded:

- The individual risk contours, to persons outdoors corresponding to the Outer Land Use Planning zone extends to the proposed development. The contour extends to a small section of the Marina Promenade, the Renmore Promenade and the Rail Link, where it is possible that persons will be present outdoors.
- The individual risk contours, to persons indoors corresponding to the Outer Land Use Planning zone extends to the proposed development. The contour extends to the Harbour Stores building. This building could be occupied 24 hours per day; therefore, persons are present indoors.

9.1.1 Suitability of Proposed Development to Land Use Planning Zones

The Sensitivity Levels used in the Land Use Planning Methodology are based on a rationale which allows progressively more severe restrictions to be imposed as the sensitivity of the proposed scheme increases. The sensitivity levels are:

Level 1 Based on normal working population;
Level 2 Based on the general public – at home and involved in normal activities;
Level 3 Based on vulnerable members of the public (children, those with mobility difficulties or those unable to recognise physical

danger); and

Level 4 Large examples of Level 3 and large outdoor examples of Level 2 and Institutional Accommodation.

Table 34 details the matrix that is used by the HSA to advise on suitable development for technical LUP purposes:

Level of Sensitivity	Inner Zone (Zone 1)	Middle Zone (Zone 2)	Outer Zone (Zone 3)
Level 1	✓	✓	✓
Level 2	×	✓	✓
Level 3	×	×	✓
Level 4	×	×	×

Table 34 LUP Matrix

The Harbour Stores building is a work place that will have fewer than 100 occupants and fewer than three occupied storeys. Therefore, it is classified as a Sensitivity Level 1 establishment and is permitted within the inner, middle and outer zones.

The Marina Promenade and Renmore Promenade is for outdoor use by the public where the general public could be present. These areas could have up to 200 No. persons present; therefore, they are classified as '*Outdoor use by the Public – predominantly open-air developments likely to attract the general public in numbers greater than 100 people, but up to 1,000 people at any one time'* and is a Sensitivity Level 3 development. Therefore, it is permitted within the outer zone.

The Rail Link is a Sensitivity Level 1 development; therefore, it is permitted within the inner, middle and outer zones.

It is concluded that the proposed development is permitted within the Land Use Planning zones at the Circle K establishment.

10.0 SOCIETAL RISK CONSTRAINTS

The purpose of this societal risk study is to generate advice on the types/nature and scale of development that is likely to be acceptable to the HSA at the proposed development at Galway Harbour.

Table 35 details the occupied areas at the proposed development. It is conservatively assumed that the maximum population is present.

Area	Population	Occupancy factor	Overpressure vulnerability	Scenarios with potential for fatalities
Harbour Stores Warehouse	10	1	CIA 3	Tank 2 rupture and VCE Tanks 2, 8, 9 rupture and flash fire
Marina Office	10	1	CIA 3	N/a
Harbour Offices	5	1	CIA 3	N/a
Cruise Terminal Building	100	0.21	CIA 3	N/a
Security Gatehouse	2	1	CIA 4	Tanks 2, 8, 9 rupture and flash fire
Renmore Promenade	100*	0.5*	Outdoors	Tank 2 rupture and pool fire Tank 2, 8, 9 rupture and flash fire
Marina Promenade	200*	0.5*	Outdoors	Tanks 2, 8, 9 rupture and flash fire

Table 35 Occupied Areas at Proposed Development (*see Note 2)

Note 2

This is a conservative estimate of typical number of persons that could be outdoors at the Marina Promenade or the Renmore Promenade. It is assumed that persons at either Promenade could be present up to 12 hours per day. It is noted that the consequences of the flash fire scenarios only extend to a section of the Marina Promenade; however, for the purposes of this assessment it is assumed that the whole of Marina Promenade is within the flash fire contour.

The TLUP Guidelines (HSA, 2023) states that persons are assumed to be indoors 90% of the time. The TLUP Guidelines also state that the probability of fatality within the flash fire envelope to persons indoors, is 10%. Therefore, for the purposes of this assessment, the frequency for a flash fire will be adjusted, from the frequency in the TLUP Guidelines, to account for persons outdoors and persons indoors, as follows:

- Outdoor Flash Fire: 100% fatality will be assumed for 10% of the time an adjustment of 0.1 (1 *x* 0.1)
- Indoor Flash Fire: 10% fatality will be assumed for 90% of the time: an adjustment of 0.09 (0.1 *x* 0.9)

The HSA's TLUP guidance document states that D_5 conditions are assumed to occur 80% of the time and F_2 are assumed to occur 20% of the time (HSA, 2023).
Table 36 details the base frequency per year and chances per million, which incorporate the adjustments for weather conditions and proportion of time spent

outdoors, for scenarios with potential fatalities at the proposed development. It is assumed that persons will be outdoors 100% of the time at the Marina Promenade and the Renmore Promenade.

Event	Base Frequency (per year)	Receptor	CPM (chances per million)
Tank 2 LOC and VCE	1.82E-06	Indoors	1.63
Tank 2 Instantaneous Failure and pool fire (outdoors)	9.96E-07	Outdoors	1.00
Tank 2 Instantaneous Failure and Flash Fire (Weather Category F2)	5.46E-07	Indoors	0.010
		Outdoors	0.011
Tank 2 Failure over 10 minutes and Flash Fire (Weather Categories F2 and D5)	5.46E-07	Indoors	0.049
		Outdoors	0.055
Tank 9 Failure over 10 minutes and Flash Fire (Weather Category F2)	5.46E-07	Indoors	0.010
		Outdoors	0.011

Table 36 Societal Risk Frequencies and Chances per Million (CPM)

Table 37 details the Societal Risk calculation for the proposed scheme. The Expectation Value (EV) at the proposed scheme is calculated to be **48.4**.

Section 1.7 of the TLUP (HSA, 2023) states:

'for new developments near an establishment, where the calculated off-site EV at the development greater than 2,000, further assessment of societal risk will be required.'

The total Expectation Value (EV) at the proposed scheme is **48.4.** This is <2,000; therefore, no further risk calculation is required.

Receptor	Security Gatehouse	Harbour Stores	Marina Promenade	Marina Office	Renmore Promenade
Vul to Tank 2 Rupture and VCE	0	0.01	0	0	0
Vul to Tank 2 Rupture Flash Fire (Outdoors)	1	1	1	1	1
Vul to Tank 2 Leak Flash Fire (Outdoors)	1	1	1	1	1
Vul to Tank 9 Leak and Flash Fire (Outdoors)	1	1	1	1	1
Vul to Tank 8 Leak and Flash Fire (Outdoors)	1	1	1	1	1
Vul to Tank 2 Rupture Flash Fire (Indoors)	0.1	0.1	0	0.1	0
Vul to Tank 2 Leak Flash Fire (Indoors)	0.1	0.1	0	0.1	0
Vul to Tank 9 Leak and Flash Fire (Indoors)	0.1	0.1	0	0.1	0
Vul to Tank 8 Leak and Flash Fire (Indoors)	0.1	0.1	0	0.1	0
Vul Tank 2 Rupture and Pool Fire (Outdoors)	0	0	0	0	0.2
Occupants	2	10	200	10	100
Occupancy Factor	1	1	0.5	1	0.5
Fatalities	9	44	800	44	420
Expectation Value	0.2	1.1	17.5	1.0	28.7

Table 37 *Societal Risk Calculation*

11.0 CONCLUSION

AWN Consulting Ltd. was requested by the Galway Harbour Company to complete a land use planning assessment addressing potential constraints posed by the Circle K Galway Terminal Upper Tier COMAH establishment to the development of the Galway Harbour Extension, Co. Galway.

The assessment is completed following the Health and Safety Authority's Guidance on technical land-use planning advice For planning authorities and COMAH establishment operators (HSA, 2023).

The Circle K Galway Upper Tier COMAH establishment provides for the importation and storage of ULSD (ultra-low sulphur diesel), kero (kerosene) and gasoline from ships. It also receives ethanol from road tankers. Pool fire, vapour cloud explosion and flash fire major accident scenarios were assessed for land use planning purposes.

Gexcon Riskcurves Version 12.3.0 modelling software was used to model the cumulative risk contours for the Circle K establishment.

The consequence results, frequencies of major accident hazards and Athenry synoptic station wind speed and frequency data (see Figure 4) were input to the software. The fraction for D5 (daytime conditions) was 0.8 and the fraction for F2 night time conditions was 0.2.

The individual risk contours, to persons outdoors and persons indoors (CIA 3), for the Circle K upper tier COMAH establishment corresponding to the boundaries of the Inner, Middle and Outer risk-based land use planning zones are illustrated on the following Figures.

Individual Risk of Fatality Contours, to Persons Outdoors, for Circle K Galway Terminal

Individual Risk of Fatality Contours, to Persons Indoors (CIA 3), for Circle K Galway Terminal

The following is concluded:

- The individual risk contours, to persons outdoors corresponding to the Outer Land Use Planning zone extends to the proposed development. The contour extends to a small section of the Marina Promenade, the Renmore Promenade and the Rail Link, where it is possible that persons will be present outdoors.
- The individual risk contours, to persons indoors corresponding to the Outer Land Use Planning zone extends to the proposed development. The contour extends to the Harbour Stores building. This building could be occupied 24 hours per day; therefore, persons are present indoors.

The Table below details the matrix that is used by the HSA to advise on suitable development for technical LUP purposes:

Level of Sensitivity	Inner Zone (Zone 1)	Middle Zone (Zone 2)	Outer Zone (Zone 3)
Level 1	✓	✓	✓
Level 2	×	✓	✓
Level 3	×	×	✓
Level 4	×	×	×

LUP Sensitivity Matrix

The Harbour Stores building is a work place that will have fewer than 100 occupants and fewer than three occupied storeys. Therefore, it is classified as a Sensitivity Level 1 establishment and is permitted within the inner, middle and outer zones.

The Marina Promenade and Renmore Promenade is for outdoor use by the public where the general public could be present. These areas could have up to 200 No. persons present; therefore, they are classified as '*Outdoor use by the Public – predominantly open-air developments likely to attract the general public in numbers greater than 100 people, but up to 1,000 people at any one time'* and is a Sensitivity Level 3 development. Therefore, it is permitted within the outer zone.

The Rail Link is a Sensitivity Level 1 development; therefore, it is permitted within the inner, middle and outer zones.

It is concluded that the proposed development is permitted within the Land Use Planning zones at the Circle K establishment.

<u>Societal Risk</u>

A societal risk analysis was completed and the expectation value (EV) at the proposed development was calculated as **48.4**.

The Guidance on Technical Land Use Planning (HSA, 2023) states:

'for new developments near an establishment, where the calculated off-site EV at the development greater than 2,000, further assessment of societal risk will be required.'

The total Expectation Value (EV) at the proposed development is **48.4.** This is <2,000; therefore, no further risk calculation is required.

It is concluded that there are no constraints posed by the Circle K Galway Terminal Upper Tier COMAH establishment to the development of the Galway Harbour Extension.

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